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PUBLIC PURPOSE, LAW, AND ECONOMICS:




All the social sciences must be co-workers, and emphatically all must be co-
workers with jurisprudence. When we set off a bit of social control and define
its bounds by analytical criteria and essay to study it by its own light and with
its own materials and its own methods exclusively, our results, however logical
in appearance, are as arbitrary and as futile for any but theoretical purposes, as
the division of the body of the defaulting debtor among his co-creditors in prim-
itive law.3
To one interested in stating the common law or in drafting legislation
an articulation of the public purpose served by a common law or
statutory pronouncement is essential. Public purpose, said English
jurist Burrough, "is a very unruly horse, and when once you get
astride of it you never know where it will carry you." 2 The rationales
* Assistant Professor, University of Notre Dame. LL.M., University of Illinois, 1985; J.D.,
West Virginia University, 1982; M.A., Marshall University, 1977; M.B.A., Marshall University, 1976;
B.S., West Virginia Institute of Technology, 1974.
1. R. PoUND, LAW AND MolSm 115 (2d ed. 1926).
2. Richardson v. Mellish, 2 BINGnAm 229 (1824). (Burrough, J.). Many courts have had dif-
ficulty articulating just what "public policy" is and its proper role in law. Justice Wanamaker of
the Ohio Supreme Court expressed it this way:
What is the meaning of 'public policy'? A correct definition, at once concise and com-
prehensive, of the words 'public policy,' has not yet been formulated by our courts. * *
* In substance, it may be said to be the community common sense and common conscience,
extended and applied throughout the state to matters of public morals, public health, public
safety, public welfare, and the like. It is that general and well settled opinion relating to
man's plain, palpable duty to his fellow men, having due regard to all the circumstances
of each particular relation and situation.
Sometimes such public policy is declared by Constitution; sometimes by statute; sometimes
by judicial decision. More often, however, it abides only in the customs and conventions
of the people - in their clear consciousness and conviction of what is naturally and in-
herently just and right between man and man. It regards the primary principles of equity
and justice and is sometimes expressed under the title of social and industrial justice, as
it is conceived by our body politic. When a course of conduct is cruel or shocking to the
1
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behind public purpose are indeed varied and draw from political
theory, economics, theology, philosophy, psychology, and cultural
history to name but a few. Critiques of common law and statutory
purpose, however, tend to be narrowly focused, i.e., a regulatory
scheme is condemned because it is "bad economics" or, in an action
at common law, that allowing a particular cause of action will result
in "unmeritorious lawsuits. ' 3 Such may in fact be the case, but the
average man's conception of justice, such course of conduct must be held to be obviously
contrary to public policy, though such policy has never been so written in the bond, whether
it be Constitution, statute, or decree of court. It has frequently been said that such public
policy, is a composite of constitutional provisions, statutes, and judicial decisions, and some
courts have gone so far as to hold that it is limited to these. The obvious fallacy of such
a conclusion is quite apparent from the most superficial examination. When a contract is
contrary to some provision in the Constitution, we say it is prohibited by the Constitution
not by public policy. When a contract is contrary to a statute, we say it is prohibited by
a statute, not by a public policy. When a contract is contrary to a settled line of judicial
decisions, we say it is prohibited by the law of the land, but we do not say it is contrary
to public policy. Public policy is the cornerstone - the foundation - of all Constitutions,
statutes, and judicial decisions; and its latitude and longitude, its height and its depth,
greater than any or all of them. If this be not true, whence came the first judicial aecision
on matter of public policy? There was no precedent for it, else it would not have been the
first.
Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Kinney, 95 Ohio St. 64, 67-69, 115 N.E. 505, 506-07 (1916).
3. The "bad" economics argument has been used for everything from tax reform and securities
regulation to most employee protection legislation and environmental protection. Of course the com-
ponents of good vis-a-vis bad economics are rarely articulated. Good or bad economics is con~lusionary
and based on whose interests are being affected or whose purpose is being served. Public purpose
analysis must transcend mere parochial interest and broaden its scope of inquiry. An example in the
legislative arena was the debate over The Labor-Management Notification and Consultation Act of
1985, H.R. 1616, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), with the opponents concluding that providing minimal
notice (with exigent circumstances exempt) of plant closures and relocations severely hampers an
organization's ability to respond to changing economic conditions. Little consideration of the more
complex effects on communities, the support infrastructure in terms of resources and services, and
consideration of displaced employees was present. Moreover, little understanding of the managerial
decision process in terms of timing, constraints and objectives was articulated. A similar version of
the bill was introduced in the new Congress as the Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment
and Assistance Act of 1987, S. 538/H.R. 1122, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), and, as of this writing,
is in committee. At the state level, related legislation was recently upheld by the Supreme Court in
Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 107 S. Ct. 2211 (1987).
The unmeritorious suit, or "pandora's box" argument has been used to constrain the scope
of tort damages (i.e., emotional distress) and entire causes of action, (i.e., the scope of abusive
discharge actions). Conclusionary statements abound, ofttimes relying on precedent which at the time
was equally conclusionary. See, e.g., the "Woods Rule" establishing the employers right to discharge
employees at will as discussed in Weyland, Present Status of Individual Employee Rights, 1970 NYU
22N ANiuAL CoNF. ON LABOR 171. Failure to reassess precedent in light of broader considerations
along a time sequence is to ignore the dynamic nature of societal relationships.
The two categories are not mutually exclusive. The recent debate over the purported medical
[Vol. 90
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analysis should entertain inputs from all pertinent social science dis-
ciplines and identify the underlying assumptions and constraints. In
other words, the elusive public purpose must be taken apart for
systematic analysis but then put back together again and viewed as
a factor interacting in the dynamics of the social order.
A process orientation is, of course, not new. Nor is the common
sense observation that any view of public purpose is by necessity
multi-disciplinary. Drawing from the often contradictory legislative
policy statements or common law precedents, attorneys, judges and
legislators use the social sciences to attempt to draw analogies and
deduce consistent, predictable, and equitable "rules of the game"
in a social order. However, unlike many of our sister disciplines in
the social order, law is not necessarily bounded but rather entertains
the dynamics of the process in a "seamless web."
The problems in describing such a system are indeed substantial.
Unlike the physical sciences, the social science disciplines use and
define similar terminology quite differently. Frequently assumptions
are made for ease of analysis which render the results nothing more
than an intellectual curiosity or a self-fulfilled prophecy. The lack
of a common unit of measurement and analysis with which to com-
pare outputs and ascertain the success or failure of the desired public
purpose renders cross-disciplinary social science and public policy
evaluations inconvertible. Our system of social order is somewhat
chaotic and predominately trial and error - not that this is nec-
essarily bad, since the result can be self-recovery and self-correction
due to the dynamics of the system. The legal order does not function
in a vacuum nor is it entirely subservient to any other discipline.
The social sciences interact synergistically in the social order, some-
times as an obstruction to public purpose achievement, sometimes
as a facilitator of unpredicted results. The problem is to understand
the process, expose the underlying assumptions and manipulate the
malpractice crisis, its causes and impact, contains an abundance of statements of good economics
versus bad economics, accusations of unmeritorious lawsuits and greedy plaintiff attorneys, and the
"economic inefficiency" of jury behavior and awards. The depth of the issues contains more complex
interactions with other factors in the social order than the insurance industry and medical profession
care to recognize. Thus, the legal system must not only choose among decision paths but also be
knowledgeable in asking the correct questions.
19871
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process to achieve the public good while maintaining flexibility and
individual freedom within standardized expectations and order. With
this view, we have now exceeded the bounds of parochial disciplinary
research.
The analysis of public purpose necessarily begins with an artic-
ulation of a descriptive paradigm of the social order.4 From a general
descriptive paradigm, particularized public purpose models can be
drawn and evaluated as parts of the greater whole.5 The theoretical
foundation for such a general descriptive paradigm was laid over
sixty years ago by Professor John R. Commons and his colleagues
in what later became known as the institutional economic approach.
The sections that follow contrast the modern variants to the Com-
mons' paradigm including the attempts to subordinate legal policy
to the narrow concept of economic efficiency, the limitations of cost-
benefit techniques and the rise of balancing tests, and the failure
of theoretical models to adequately serve legal policymakers. The
article proposes that recent advances in the art of computer modeling
and dynamic simulation suggest a return to the richness of the Com-
mons' paradigm in legal policy analyses.
II. LAW As AN EFmcIENT ECONOMC MARKET?
"If the only tool you have is a hammer, you tend to treat eve-
rything as if it were a nail. ' 6 The metaphor by organizational the-
orist Abraham Maslow is quite appropriate in assessing the impact
of economic theory on law. The attempt to impose the economic
concept of efficiency to law, through the prolific writings of Judge
4. The search for a general paradigm of the social order has been addressed by a variety of
early scholars each focusing upon their particular areas of expertise. Commons is no exception; but
what is unique about the Commons materials is their actual embrace of diverse disciplines rather than
mere recognition of their importance followed by systematic exclusion. In this regard he was a truly
unique scholar.
5. The development of particular models is beyond the scope of this article. Nor is this article
intended to serve as a road map of model construction. The development of particular models will
be an extension, but not necessarily a mirror image, of the general system paradigm drawn from the
Commons materials.
6. A. MAstow, Tim PsYcHoLoGY oF SciENcE: A RECONraMSSANCE (1966).
[Vol. 90
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Richard Posner7 and the "Chicago School" economists, is an ex-
ample of bounded analyses distorting an understanding of the whole
through a myopic focus on one set of variables. This approach views
law as a subset of economics, merely a special case of economic
working rules created to mediate the effects of market aberrations. 8
The problems inherent with the economics of law as practiced
by the Chicago School adherents lie in part with their methodology.
Viewed in terms of philosophy of science, the positivist economists
begin with theory and create bounded tests to assess the theory. This
approach, whether practiced by the economist or the physicist, has
the potential of confusing mental ideal models with reality and the
circular validation of underlying assumptions. Moreover, the tech-
niques tend to posit static and linear relationships assuming away
arguably important variables. Static and linear mathematical models
(positing constant rates of change) allow for ease of test analysis
7. A bibliography of Richard Posner's legal writings would take several pages. Needless to
say, in terms of quantity, Posner is one of the most prolific legal writers. His writings on law and
economics generally echo the extreme free market positions of Milton Friedman and a clique of
economists originally at the University of Chicago. See, e.g., R. PosaNR, EcoNomc ANALYsIs oF LAW
(3d ed. 1986). For Judge Posner's most recent exposition on the subject, see Posner, The Law and
Economics Movement, 77 Am. EcoN. Rav. 1 (1987).
8. See generally, R. PosenR, EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 7.
If efficiency is viewed as a mathematical utilitarian construction of minimizing input mix to
maximizing output (profit or utility), several underlying assumptions become instrumental. Efficiency,
under conditions of man-created and natural scarcity, is manifested as price theory for goods and
services in the market. Without going into great detail, consider the importance of perfect information,
rationality, and the ability to ascertain an appropriate value (i.e., put a mathematical cost) on all
pertinent variables. Moreover, the analysis assumes an underlying system of order and standardized
expectations. But this begs the question of where the system of order emanates. Is it Adam Smith's
divine providence or a garden of Eden natural order?
Nice, clean, analytical solutions (e.g., equilibrium) can be achieved with linear models, i.e.,
events occurring along a sequential line in one dimension. The econometric testing of a theory can
be made easier assuming linear relationships. Linear models are not necessarily static and can contain
feedback loops along the tested dimension. But reality, it can be argued, contains a "nest of circular
and interlocking structures wherein an action can induce not only correction but also fluctuation,
counterpressures, and even accentuation of the forces producing the original symptoms of distress."
Forrester, System Dynamics-Future Opportunities, in Sysmss DYNAmcs 13 (A. Legasto ed. 1980)
(hereinafter Forrester, System Dynamics]. These nests of dynamic interaction create multiple dimen-
sions of analysis requiring nonlinear modeling.
See also Liebhafsky, Price Theory as Jurisprudence: Law and Economics, Chicago Style, 10
J. EcoN. IssuEs 23 (1976); Liebhafsky, The Problem of Social Cost An Alternative Approach, 13
NAT. REsotncas J. 616 (1973). Economist Kenneth Boulding characterized an attempt by certain
economists to dominate the social sciences as economic imperialism. Boulding, Economics as a Moral
Science, 59 AM. ECON. Ray. 8 (1969). See also infra note 15 and accompanying text.
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and mathematical rigor. As expected, economic efficiency following
the Chicago School has, with few exceptions, posited linear math-
ematical relationships among their selectively defined variables. Li-
nearity allows for rigor in econometric models but not necessarily
reality.
In contrast, the legal system and institutional economists draw
theory from the broad informational base provided by case studies.
The broad informational base provided by case studies injects non-
linearity (variable rates of change) and a dynamic interaction among
variables. Case study analysis, however, is frequently criticized as
lacking in mathematical rigor. The difficulty of quantifying these
complex relationships suggests the need for dynamic analytical tech-
niques. The response has been the rising use of computer assisted
simulation techniques.
To foist legal policies into the Chicago School methodology re-
sults in significant distortions of equity, nonmonetary remedies, and
the inherent inefficiency of a republican democracy.9 Not all societal
interactions are rationally based or submit graciously to perfect mar-
ket theories. Human interactions rarely follow linear expressions
(constant rates of change). Moreover, following the "law as an ef-
ficient market" approach, conflict and unequal power are simply
assumed to be resolved via a bargaining transaction exclusively with-
out attendant effects on other societal members. This extreme po-
sition is encompassed in the "Coase Theorem" expressing the view
that bargaining transactions will result in similar resource allocations
(those that are economically efficient) assuming no transaction costs
and regardless of the presence or absence of legal rights and duties. 10
Thus, customary working rules and relationships become nature;
tension points are the result of irrational economic behavior in their
9. See supra note 8. See also Lowry, Bargain and Contract Theory in Law and Economics,
10 J. ECON. IssuES 1 (1976); Rizzo, Law Amid Flux: The Economics of Negligence and Strict Liability
in Tort, 9 J. LEGAL STtD. 291 (1980).
10. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). The Coase article spawned
numerous critiques. See, e.g., Lowry, supra note 9, and Liebhafsky, The Problem of Social Cost An
Alternative Approach, supra note 8.
[Vol. 90
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perfect market and, for ease of analysis, are assumed away.1
Economic principles are but a part of the determination of public
purpose and must enter in our construction of legal policy analysis.
The legal profession seems to instinctively recognize this fact but is
frequently at a loss to generate the broad scope needed in their
analyses. This results in the construction of balancing tests, admi-
rably constructed to bring resolution to the conflict in positions be-
fore the courts, but frequently lacking in an articulation and
appreciation of the full scope of the costs involved. 12 In other words,
the legal profession creates a gulf between having legal rights in
theory and having legal rights in practice.
III. TIE FAILURE OF THEoRETIcAL MODELS
Law, it can be argued, does not lend itself to the theoretical
modeling used in other social sciences. In law, variables do not hold
themselves constant and the context of a conflict cannot be assumed
away for ease of analysis. Since the power of legal sanction is re-
quested by a litigant, law cannot ignore underlying assumptions,
causation and intent."t Law is purpose oriented: the goal is to resolve
a conflict or to right some perceived mischief; it is not to publish
a paper. 14 Moreover, the nature of evidentiary rules, coupled with
11. These considerations render this polarized position to subordinate law to economic principles
bizarre. A society governed by strict economic utilitarianism would tend to be, paraphrasing Hobbes,
mean, brutal, and short. Many societal interactions are not the products of maximizing self interest
but of self sacrifice for the public good or a higher moral code. Professor H. H. Liebhafsky, a
lawyer/economics Ph.D., vigorously critiques these underlying assumptions in an excellent piece en-
titled Price Theory as Jurisprudence: Law and Economics, Chicago Style concluding that these writings
should be considered as ceremonial observances rather than scientific observations "produced by
economists who know no law and a handful of lawyers who have learned their economics from these
same economists." See, Liebhafsky, Price Theory as Jurisprudence: Law and Economics, Chicago
Style, supra note 8, at 40.
12. See infra note 47.
13. If law is to approach the ideal of justice, the legal system must not become straitjacketed
by rigid rules. Thus, the need arises for the "equity" component in law. "Equity," wrote Aristotle,
"is the correction of that wherein the law, by reason of its generality, is deficient." Commons'
comment that due process is "guided by sympathy and limited by duty" is an appropriate articulation.
J. Co,11iONS, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 351 (1924) [hereinafter J. COMMONS, LEGAL
FoUNDATIONs].
14. Much criticism from practitioners focuses on this very point. This is not to deprecate the-
oretical research or the bounded analyses from the social sciences. The legal profession is uniquely
qualified to undertake and coordinate broad-based analyses. Importantly, the legal policy makers who
use these research studies must be aware of methodological limitations to prevent misuse. One is
reminded of a piece of folk wisdom attributed to Mark Twain: "Figures don't lie - but liars figure."
1987]
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the concept of due process, requires an examination of causation,
causal directions and liability rather than statistically significant re-
lationships emanating from narrowly bounded linear models without
regard to causal direction or potentially intervening variables." Fi-
nally, adjudication is reactive, not necessarily proactive. While the
creation of statutory pronouncements may be viewed as future ori-
ented, the application and interpretation of the law are, to para-
phrase Justice Holmes, what the courts say they are. t6
Law has more in common with the engineering methodologies-
than many social science models. 7 Engineering, like law, focuses
upon a purpose to resolve a real world problem. Engineering takes
past theory, experience and insight to piece together components of
a system. Then, focusing on causal directions and power flows among
the components, it tests, examines feedback, and retests, always fo-
cusing on what works in practice. As such, theory and assumptions
are always at risk and subject to redesign as more information is
accumulated. Models are deduced from reality (case studies) rather
than reality bounded to fit a pet theory. 18 Law is not intellectually
risk free; like engineering, it must operate beyond the limits of ex-
isting information. Nevertheless, consequences flow from inaction
as well as action.
Drawing from the engineering analogy, one can view the social
order as a similarly structured "black box" designed to accomplish
15. Much econometric research, for example, examines linear relationships and tests for sta-
tistical significance. Professor Friedman, for example, argues that underlying assumptions and causal
directions are unimportant since his true test of a model is its ability to predict. He goes so far as
to argue that this is the sole criterion and that the model need not even be realistic. Friedman, The
Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN PosInV ECONo.uics 3 (1953). This approach has
generated many articles in rebuttal. See also, supra note 8.
16. 0. HoLuEs, TBr CommoN LAW (1881).
17. These views are greatly influenced by the writings of Jay Forrester at MIT. See generally,
Forrester, Common Foundations Underlying Engineering and Management, INST. ELEc. & ELEC. ENO'R
SPEcTRUM 66 (1964); Forrester, System Dynamics, supra note 8, at 7.
18. Clinging to outdated theories seems to be an occupational hazard among many theorists.
The models ofttimes represent ideal interactions rather than reality. When reality interferes, the models
assume away the distorting factors. The Coase Theorem, cited above, is an example of a theory that
would successfully operate only in the garden of Eden. See supra notes 8-11. See also T. KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCINTnc REVOLUTIONS (1970).
[Vol. 90
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identified public purposes. 19 The building of these "black boxes"
requires the mind set of the engineer who uses theory to accomplish
purpose. A reexamination of the Commons' paradigm is but the
first step in the construction of real world models.
IV. J. R. COMMONS AND THE INSTITUTIONAL PARADIGM
John R. Commons (1862-1945) was an economist by training, a
unique and original scholar, and an active participant in the creation
of, and policy analysis behind, government regulation of economic
affairs. 20 Although associated with the democratic and progressive
movements in Wisconsin during the early part of this century, he
remained essentially a pragmatist and an astute observer of eco-
nomic, legal and political behavior. Commons sought an under-
standing of the fundamental components in the evolutionary process
of social order. With an understanding of the social order, its as-
sumptions and working rules, components in the process could be
restructured to achieve the public good. His focus was truly inter-
disciplinary, encompassing economics, law, ethics, psychology and
history. As such, many modern scholars, focusing on narrow spe-
cializations and preoccupied with quantitative techniques, have had
difficulty with the scope and complexity of his largely theoretical
and qualitative views. 21 They have, to borrow from Roscoe Pound,22
19. A caveat is in order. This assumes a consensus can be reached on what exactly is the
purpose of the legal rule and that the legal system can discern that purpose. Ofttimes this is the
matter in controversy. Cf. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Con-
stitution, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 263 (1982).
20. The scholarly productivity of Commons and his associates at the University of Wisconsin
was remarkable. In addition to voluminous legislative policy analysis, his writings encompass scores
of articles and books on labor history, labor economics, law and legal history, and a refinement of
the institutional view of economics. The major research treatises included J. COMMONS, LEaAL FoUb-
DATIONS, supra note 13; J. COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: ITS PLACE IN POLTICAL ECONOMsY
(1934) [hereinafter J. COMMONS, INsTrruTioNAL ECONOMICS]; J. COMMONS, TBE ECONOMiCS OF COL-
LECTrvE ACTION (1950) [hereinafter J. COMMONS, COLLECTrVE ACTION]. These research treatises serve
as an outline for policy analysis.
A partial bibliography of Commons' writings appears in J. COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS,
9-12. See also notes and reference material contained in Gonce, John R. Commons' Legal Economic
Theory, 5 J. ECON. IssuEs 80 (1971).
21. Commons' writing style and the inherent difficulty of quantifying his work have led many
scholars to dismiss his work out of hand. Their analyses are quantifiably bounded to such a degree
that they lose perspective of the whole. The Commons' approach does not dismiss mathematical
19871
9
Zimarowski: Public Purpose, Law, and Economics: J. R. Commons and the Institu
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1988
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
taken the system selectively apart, held the other components con-
stant or ignored them altogether, and proclaimed a result. Com-
mons, the pragmatic observer, although humbled by the sheer
complexity of the social system, could not accept such a simplistic
approach.
A. A Systems Approach
Systems approaches are not new techniques in attempting to clas-
sify and analyze relationships between variables. These techniques,
often operating under a variety of terminology, have been used in
the biological and physical sciences, philosophy, various social sci-
ences, and the management sciences, particularly in analyzing in-
dustrial relations theory.2 The common characteristics of these system
analysis; he simply recognizes it as a tool of analysis rather than the analysis itself.
[B]ut this position [Commons'] does offer promise of giving a basis for a genuine theory
based upon social categories, yet incorporating mathematical analyses to the full where the
social relations to be analyzed have actually been quantified and regularized in the course
of social action . . . . Policy and social control require analysis of social organization,
valuation, and action. To concentrate upon statistical methods may lead one not only to
lose reference to the distinctly social, but also to concentrate upon the outcomes and residues
of social action rather than its basic structure.
Parsons, John R. Commons' Point of View, in J. COMMONS, COLLECTVE ACTION, supra note 20, at
372 (Appendix iii).
This broader vision is also reflected in the writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The life
of law has not been logic: it has been experience . . . . The law embodies the story of a nation's
development through many centuries, and cannot be dealt with as if it contained only axioms and
corollaries of a book of mathematics." 0.- HoLMsS, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 16, at 1. The
evolutionary nature of law is unsettling to the mind seeking order, but the dynamic complexity of
social order will not support rigidity. "Much of the uncertainty of law is not an unfortunate accident:
it is of immense social value." J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 7 (1931).
The broader theoretical implications of Commons' writings are once again resurfacing in writings
by his fellow economists and may stimulate robust debate as a foil to the myopic positions of supply
side economics. See, e.g., Parsons, John R. Commons: His Relevance to Contemporary Economics,
19 J. ECON. IssUEs 755 (1985); Rutherford, J. R. Commons' Institutional Economics, 17 J. ECON.
IssUEs 721 (1983); Grossack & Loescher, Institutional and Mainstream Economics: Choice and Power
as the Basis for Synthesis, 14 J. ECON. IssUEs 925 (1980); and Dugger, Property Rights, Law, and
John R. Commons, 38 REv. SOC. ECON. 41 (1980).
22. See supra note I & accompanying quotation by Dean Pound.
23. See, e.g., Hagen, Analytical Models in the Study of Social Systems, 67 AM. J. Soc. 144
(1961); Von Bertalanffy, The Theory of Open Systems in Physics and Biology, 3 SC. 23 (1950);
Selznick, Foundations of the Theory of Organizations, 13 AM. Soc. REv. 25 (1948); Koestler, Beyond
Atomism and Holism - The Concept of the Holon, JANUS 289 (1979); Katz & Kahn, Common
Characteristics of Open Systems, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIzING 86 (1966); J. DUNLOP,
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEMS (1958).
[Vol. 90
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approaches include (1) an articulation and classification of signifi-
cant variables, (2) a qualitative set of operational premises and an
operational determination of system boundaries, (3) a structured study
of variable interdependence, and (4) a recognition that the variables
are dynamic and evolutionary, not static, requiring an examination
in historical context with changes studied through time.24
The Commons' paradigm adheres to these common character-
istics. Commons' scope of analysis, however, is more complex and
intellectually challenging, incorporating a truly interdisciplinary ap-
proach. His methodology is an extension of the case study approach
with its inherently broad and diverse informational base. As such,
the operational determination of system boundaries does not lend
itself to parochial disciplinary classifications. The focus is a prag-
matic one: what has happened when a variable or set of variables
(his terminology is "factors") interact, over time, in our social sys-
tem? Second,what are the working rules of society established by
these interactions? And third, can said variables be manipulated to
bring about a desired purpose? With these questions in the forefront,
Commons formulates his concept of limiting and complementary
variables (factors) .25
Commons viewed a limiting factor as strategic; as such, it "is
the one whose control, in the right form, at the right place and
time, will set the complementary factors at work to bring about the
results intended." 26 He viewed the complementary factors as routine
transactions, artificially selected, but yet distinct from limiting fac-
tors in that they respond to, in research parlance are dependent
upon, changes in the limiting factors (independent variables). If all
the routine, complementary factors "become limiting factors at one
point in time, then none of them is strategic, and the matter is
hopeless. 27 For example, in the current debate over AIDS (Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome) testing, the voluntary or mandatory
24. See, e.g., J. DUNLoP, INDusmiAL RELATIONS SYSTMs 382-83, 385-88 (1958).
25. J. CONSIONs, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 13, at 374; J. COMMONS, INSTrUTnONAL
EcoNoMCS, supra note 20, at 89-90, 627-48.
26. J. CONMONS, INsTrrTTONAL EcONOMCS, supra note 20, at 628.
27. Id. at 90.
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nature of the testing process is a limiting factor interacting upon a
myriad of complementary factors, i.e., marriage decisions, employ-
ment, medical treatment, etc. Each form of testing triggers different
reactions in the "nests" of complementary factors which must be
measured against the purpose desired.
The dynamic nature of Commons' system becomes apparent. The
limiting, strategic factors are not cumulative at a given point in time
but are successive during a sequence in time changing as a culture
matures and develops, i.e., when a cure is found for AIDS, the
testing variable will no longer command a strategic impact on the
complementary factors. The difficulty, of course, is in identifying
and describing the past and present limiting factors, tracing inter-
actions on the routine or complementary factors, and projecting
these interactions into the future. Extrapolating to current policy
choices, the problem becomes even more acute given the frequency
of change in society brought about by advances in technology and
the political limitations on information.
The interactions among the factors move the system toward an
end, although not always the desired one. At the outset, however,
there is a need to identify the purpose of a working rule
for which the artificial mechanism in question was designed, fashioned and re-
modeled ... whether fit] ... accomplishes that purpose in an efficient or ec-
onomical way, and, if not, what is the limiting factor, out of the thousands of
cooperating factors, that obstructs the operation, and to what extent that limiting
factor can be, and requires to be, controlled in order to facilitate the mechanism
and accomplish its purpose. Then it adopts or changes the shop rules, working
rules, common law or statute law that regulate the actions and transactions of
participants.78
The process envisioned by Commons contains three interdependent
elements. First, it is evolutionary, changing over time without nec-
essarily organized manipulation. Moreover, the validity of purpose
is situational and relative to the nature, culture, and history of the
system. Second, the selection of factors is an artificial process. Com-
mons argues it is the will in action or a volitional theory whereby
a social unit, by focusing on a limiting factor, selects a purpose even
28. J. Commors, LEGAL FouNDATIONs, supra note 13, at 377.
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if it does so without recognizing or articulating that purpose. 29 And
third, Commons looked to the "institution" operating within a vo-
litional context for working out the problems of social control2 ° An
"institution," as defined by Commons, is "collective action in con-
trol, liberation, and expansion of individual action". 3 -
The view of self-directed "collective action in control, liberation,
and expansion of individual action" forms the basis for Commons'
concept of "public purpose." Collective action manifests itself in
various types of organizational structures from commercial enter-
prises to eleemosynary organizations to sovereignties.3 2 Each organ-
izational structure develops working rules to accomplish its own
purposes. These private working rules and private purposes are as-
sessed by the "public" representative in light of broader societal
purposes. Since not all private purposes necessarily serve the public
purpose, public purpose is a classification of those private purposes
that also serve the public good.
The public is not any particular individual, it is a classification of activities in
the body politic deemed to be of value to the rest of the public, rather than a
classification of individuals. Anybody who comes along 'indifferently,' and gets
himself into a position where he might perform that class of activity, is the public.
His private interests, when he gets into that position, are deemed identical with
the public interest. When this identity is recognized by the functionaries of gov-
ernment, then to him is granted a certain share of that collective power which
he did not enjoy before, and, correspondingly, the owners of the public disutility
which places undue limits on that activity are subjected to duties of avoidance,
performance or forbearance which they did not obey before.
This is the process of classification and reclassification according to the pur-
poses of the ruling authorities, a process which has advanced with every change
in economic evolution and every change in feelings and habits towards human
29. Id. at 370-75.
Thus, it appears that the will is not Locke's will-in vacuo, nor the hedonists' conscious
pleasure and pain, separate from the will and forcing it to act, but is the will in action,
and the will in action is the faculties-in-action . . . . IT]he will is always 'up against'
something. It is always performing, avoiding, forbearing, that is, always moving along lines,
not of least resistance like physical forces without purpose, but of overcoming resistance,
with a purpose looking toward the future.
Id. at 79.
30. Institutions, as viewed by Commons, include the myriad of social organizations to which
individuals belong, including biological/social, political, economic, and moral/religious.
31. J. CommoNs, INsTrruTnoNAL ECONOMICS, supra note 20, at 902.
32. See supra note 30.
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beings, and which is but thie proportioning and reproportioning of inducements
to willing and unwilling persons, according to what is believed to be the degree
of desired reciprocity between them .... So with all other legislative and judicial
decisions which determine Freedom in one direction by imposing liability in the
opposite direction. Each is but a classification of persons according to beliefs in
their public value, with the intention of reproportioning the national economy
and thus enlarging the commonwealth.
It is often charged against legislation that the state does not create wealth
- only private activity is wealth-producing. The charge is, of course, true. Leg-
islation only classifies activities and proportions the inducements to wealth prod-
ucers. Individuals do the rest . . . . So it is with legislation and judicial decision
.... But they may waste the commonwealth by bad proportioning, may enlarge
it by good proportioning. 33
Any analysis of "bad proportioning" vis-a-vis "good proportion-
ing" must understand and critique the paradigm's operational prem-
ises and tension points.3 4
B. Operational Premises and Tension Points
The operational premises in the Commons' paradigm draw from-
many of the classical economists, political theorists, and philoso-
phers. This same source material is also reflected in the writings of
Commons' contemporaries, particularly the pragmatism of Justice
Holmes35 and the writings broadly classified under the label historical
jurisprudence.3 6
In his writings, Commons often referred to assumptions gov-
erning collective behavior in economic terms. His classifications in-
cluded sovereignty, scarcity, efficiency, futurity, and custom or
33. J. CoMMsoNs, LoAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 13, at 328-30 (emphasis added).
34. The term operational premise or assumption is easily understood but the concept of a tension
point may need some elaboration. My definition of a tension point is simply the point of convergence
between two or more defensibly correct positions. A point where balancing of relatively correct po-
sitions is required in contrast to the simplistic view of there always being a right-wrong or black-
white polarized distinction in public policy/social control areas. This approaches a philosophical rel-
ativist position but perhaps can be characterized more accurately as a pragmatic approach to social
control. "There is no truth - only argument," Anonymous.
35. See, e.g., 0. HOLMus, Tm ColMoN LAW, supra note 16. See also supra note 21.
36. It is always difficult to characterize legal writings but even more difficult to place legal
scholars under the rubrics of legal schools of thought. With that cautionary note, I will defer to
Dean Young's recent treatment of the issue in Young, Beyond Bok: Historical Jurisprudence in Re-
placement of the Enlightenment Project, 35 J. LEoAL EDUC. 333 (1985).
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working rules of collective action.3 7 These classifications, however,
simply crosscut certain premises concerning human actors in an or-
ganized society; and, from a public policy perspective, these core
premises form the base of the paradigm. As such, the following
discussion groups the premises under three classifications: scarcity,
conflict, and human direction.
The Commons' paradigm was greatly influenced by the writings
of David Hume and his conception of scarcity in society. 8 The sup-
ply, demand, and price variables are representations of scarcity of
a good in a man versus nature relationship 9 and the bane of many
a poor social science student. Hume correlated law, economics, and
ethics on the relative degree of scarcity and the cultural history of
a social order. This is in stark contrast to the assumption of abun-
dance and divine beneficence used as the foundation for the writings
of John Locke, Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham. 40 Relative scar-
city creates conflict and the need for standardization and predict-
ability in relationships. 41 These factors, in turn, prompt the creation
of legal orders, private property, and the evolution toward justice. 42
Since "neither proprietors nor courts can get jurisdiction over
objects unlimited in supply," 43 scarcity contains a nature-created di-
mension. But scarcity also has a man-created dimension. Man, seek-
ing to control nature, creates artificial scarcity (restrictions on supply)
37. These assumptions appear in all his writings although the exact terminology varied. See
also Commons, Law and Economics, 34 YALE L. REv. 371 (1925) [hereinafter Commons, Law and
Economics]; and Commons, The Problem of Correlating Law, Economics and Ethics, 8 Wis. L. REv.
3 (1932) [hereinafter Commons, Law, Economics & Ethics].
38. J. CoMMONS, INsTrruTIONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 20, at 140-57. See also, E. RohWEIN,
DAVID Huim: WVrrGs ON ECONOMICS (1970).
39. Commons, Law and Economics, supra note 37, at 371; Commons, Law, Economics &
Ethics, supra note 37, at 3; See also J. COMMONS, INSTIrrlTONAL EcONOMaICS, supra note 20, at 251-
389.
40. See generally, J. COMMONS, INSTITrrlONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 20, at 13-124, 158-217,
218-43.
41. J. CoMMoNs, INsnTuTioNAL ECONOMICS, supra note 20, at 141. Total scarcity, wrote Hume,
results in communism. Id.
42. Id. [(citing D. Huira, THE PHmosoPmcAL WORKS OF DAVID Hur, CT. Green & T. Grose
1898)].
43. Commons, Law and Economics, supra note 37, at 371.
1987]
15
Zimarowski: Public Purpose, Law, and Economics: J. R. Commons and the Institu
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1988
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
as a means of maximizing perceived self interests." This takes the
form of artificial constraints on physical resources to constraints on
labor and services to constraints on intangible property concepts
such as information, ideas and opportunities. Without scarcity, there
would be no tension between self-interest and liberty. Each citizen
would simply take all he "wanted" from the natural cornucopia.
Thus, scarcity results in competition and conflicts of interest over
natural resources at two dimensions of analysis: man versus nature
dimension, the forte of the classical economists; and man versus
man dimension, the interdisciplinary domain of all social sciences. 45
Conflict and conflict resolution are familiar terms to attorneys.
The Commons' paradigm recognizes conflict as an inevitable con-
sequence of scarcity, self-interest and social interaction. In struc-
turing his analysis of conflict, Commons recognizes that both natural
and man-created scarcity result in an unequal distribution of power
in society.46 Power, moreover, is not dormant but is the purposeful
means to an end. Although power will be used in varying degrees
dependent upon circumstances, power concedes nothing without a
demand backed by countervailing power.
Power can be viewed as a calculus of compliance vis-a-vis non-
compliance. 47 Or:
Power of A = Cost to B of noncompliance with A's terms
Cost to B of compliance with A's terms
Thus, A's power will increase as B's cost of noncompliance increases
or costs of compliance decreases. This expression is not readily quan-
tifiable. The costs can be both real and perceived, encompassing
both tangible and intangible concerns. The costs stimulate B to a
response. Power can be viewed in three interdependent contexts:
44. The scope of the process is facilitated by the legal order classifying activities in the public
interest and using the power of the state t6 protect those activities through the establishment of
enforceable rights and correlative duties.
45. Commons, Law, Economics & Ethics, supra note 37, at 4.
46. Commons, Law and Economics, supra note 37, at 344. See also J. COMMONS, LEaO FOUN-
DATIONS, supra note 13, at 11-64.
47. Adapted from the concept of bargaining power by N. CHaaERLAIN, THE EcoNoMIcS OF
CoLL cTrv BARoAnnNO, Ch.1O (1951).
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economic, physical, and moral.48 In the context of economic power,
it is the ability to manipulate and exploit scarcity. In the physical
power context, it is the ability to control physical movement, compel
attendance, and inflict punishment. And in the moral power context,
it is the ability to manipulate and exploit social status relationships
and interactions.
The distribution of the ability to impose a cost of noncompliance,
with its human direction, leads to potential conflict between and
within institutions and institution members. The social order, in
identifying the public good, must decide which classifications of
power exercise to exclusively control (i.e. physical power via criminal
law), which to simply defer to the parties (resulting in the sovereign
aiding, in effect, the cost-imposer), or whether to channel the con-
flict to a dispute resolution forum for adjudication pursuant to a
reasonable balance of interests as established by legal norms.
Equity, it is written, will not suffer a wrong to be without a
remedy (ubi jus, ibi remedium). Of course, this is simply rhetoric.
Only certain classifications of wrongs or conflict are given remedy;
others are simply left to the Darwinist survival of the most powerful.
But which ones? The short answer is that classification of conflicts
which serves the elusive public purpose; however, this is rather cir-
cuitous. The classifications of conflict given redress must be con-
strained or limited by the social order's recognition of scarcity and
the need for a standardization of expectations among societal mem-
bers .49
Order, in the furtherance of standardization of expectations
among societal members, emanates from the almost monopolistic
domain the sovereign exercises over physical power. In this regard,
the sovereign, through classifications of activities deemed within the
public good, establishes the backdrop for the creation of rights and
duties under law. In Commons' view, this complex and often con-
tradictory mix of institutional purposes and concerns forms sets of
working rules. Through a process of choosing, selective working
48. J. CoMMoNs, LEoAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 13, at 47-64.
49. J. CoMMoNs, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 20, at 57-58. See also Commons, Law
Economics & Ethics, supra note 37, at 4.
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rules take the form of rights and duties, recognized and sanctioned
through collective action." Drawing from an impressive array of
legal scholarship 5 1 Commons addressed the concept of rights and
duties as jural correlates:
There is no right [liberty] without its corresponding duty, no effective or actual
right-and-duty of individuals without both a correlative power and responsibility
of officials to come to the aid of the right by enforcing the duty. Every right
has two corresponding duties, the duty of the opposite person and the duty of
officials to exercise the collective power upon that person. For, not only is there
no right if there is no remedy but there is no remedy if there is no power to
hold officials responsible. The violation of a positive right brings into existence
at once, by 'operation of law,' a remedial 'right of action' which is none else
than the official duty of courts and executives to enforce the right."
Standardization of expectations is achieved by the protection of rights
and duties. But, as Commons observed, the rights and duties take
varied forms depending upon whether one is articulating a legal,
economic, or moral position and depending upon the nature and
purpose of the institution.53 Commons' theory creates multiple levels
of protections within the context of the social order, i.e., the right
to distribute pamphlets relating to a labor dispute varies dependent
upon the location of the distribution, the institution involved, and,
in many cases, the subject matter itself. Thus, a common unit of
analysis among these multiple levels and institutions must be artic-
ulated. To Commons, this common unit of analysis is the basic unit
of social interaction: the transaction.54 The articulation of rights and
duties under classifications of transactions is the source material for
Commons' description of the system and the limiting and comple-
mentary factors.
Transactions, under the Commons' paradigm, can take three in-
terdependent forms: bargaining, managerial, or rationing.55 Each has
economic, legal, and ethical components and forms a mix whereby
50. J. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 13, at 361-64.
51. Id. at 91 n.1.
52. Id. at 363-64.
53. Id. at 65-142.
54. Id.
55. Id. See also J. COMMONS, INSTIUTIONAL EcoNoMIcs, supra note 20, at 55-69; Commons,
Law, Economics & Ethics, supra note 37, at 5-12.
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the public weal is enlarged by good proportioning or wasted by bad
proportioning.56 Bargaining transactions transfer wealth between
parties deemed to be equal before the law by voluntary agreement,
through persuasion if economic power is equal, or coercion if un-
equal.57 Its purpose is the distribution of wealth and the inducements
to produce and deliver wealth. 8 Managerial transactions are con-
cerned with the production of wealth through the creation of "com-
mand-and-obedience" relationships.5 9 These relationships can be
viewed in a variety of contexts, i.e., state to citizen, principal to
agent, employer to employee. Nevertheless, the law recognizes one
party to a managerial transaction as a legal superior and the other
as a legal inferior within the limits, set by common law, statutes,
or constitutions, of the relationship .6 The final form of transaction,
the rationing transaction, is a relationship between legal superiors
and legal inferiors which apportions wealth and power by the direct
intervention of an authority superior to them all under the law.61
The three types of transactions are interdependent and useful for
descriptive as well as prescriptive analyses. Thus, how the trans-
actions mix in the collective social order directly affects the cor-
relative rights and duties formation. Communist and fascist
56. J. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 20, at 330.
57. Commons, Law, Economics & Ethics, supra note 37, at 5-9; J. CoMaoNs, INSTITUTIONAL
EcoNOncs, at 59-64. See also J. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 13, 64-142. The bar-
gaining transactions take the form of the sale or barter of resources.
58. See supra note 57. Commons, Law, Economics & Ethics, supra note 37, at 9.
59. Commons, Law, Economics & Ethics, supra note 37, at 9-11; J. CoMaONS, INsTrrUTIONAL
ECONOnCS, supra note 20, at 64-67. Managerial transactions can occur in the formation of employment
relationships. In a conceptually fascinating area private authoritarian organizations are given, aided
by the power of the legal order, the ability to command legally designated inferiors. As -tort law and
agency law aptly demonstrate, this command power extends beyond the service period through granting
the superior rights in intangible property. At the same time, until the erosion of the employment at
will doctrine, the inferior had little or no rights in the employment. See J. COMONS, LEGAL Fotm-
DATIONS, supra note 13, at 283-312; Commons, The Right to Work, 21 ARENA 131 (1899). In the
creation of command-and-obedience relationships the social order makes a balance; what is particularly
interesting is the justification for the choice. See discussion on custom infra note 73.
60. See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
61. Commons, Law, Economics & Ethics, supra note 37, at 11-12; J. COMMONS, INSTrrTUIONAL
EcoNOMIcs, supra note 20, at 67-69. The social order serves as a balancer of power between parties.
As such it structures their relationships and shapes the scope and direction of the issues. The inter-
dependency between the types of transactions is aptly illustrated by looking at the collective bargaining
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movements, wrote Commons, are based solely on the managerial
and rationing transactions leading to a "social philosophy of dic-
fatorship. ' ' 62 Bargaining transactions, a foundation of free enter-
prise, are "based on persuasion or coercion between those who are
legally equal, depending economically upon opportunity, competi-
tion and bargaining power, and they lead to a social philosophy of
liberty." 6 ' But bargaining transactions cannot operate without the
sovereign "standardizing the expectations" of the parties through
the establishment of order and the command-and-obedience rela-
tionships as enforced through dispute resolution forums. Nor, since
there can be no freedom of choice unless there is freedom to choose,
can economic power, as manifest by coercion and monopoly, be left
unchecked.64 "If the individual is supreme there can be no regu-
lation-if the state is supreme, there can be no freedom.''65 The
Commons' paradigm seeks a pragmatic balance between equally sup-
portable but inherently conflicting positions.
If one accepts the transaction as a basic unit of social interaction,
the motivation inducing an institution to enter a transaction becomes
instrumental to the paradigm. The Commons' paradigm posits a
volitional theory of behavior. Freedom of choice, the human will,
and the pursuit of self interest, through institutions, enhance the
public wealth through the manipulation of the limiting or strategic
factors in the social order. Commons, like Adam Smith, recognized
that the will was often times "arbitrary, capricious and contrary to
natural laws." 66 None but the naive or intellectually dishonest argues
that the public interest will be served by self-interest exclusively.
Wrote Adam Smith, "People of the same trade seldom meet to-
gether, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends
in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise
prices.' '67 As such, the pursuit of self-interest usually operates in
62. Commons, Law, Economics & Ethics, supra note 37, at 12 n.7.
63. Id.
64. See supra note 61.
65. Commons, Law and Economics, supra note 37, at 376.
66. J. CommoNs, LEaAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 13, at 376. See also J. CoMIONS, INsTJ.
mTrioNAL EcoNoMIcs, supra note 20, at 158-217.
67. A. Smu, WaEATH oF NATIONS 128 (1937). The inherent problem with unchecked self interest
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the short run without consideration of ethics or the public good,68
creating the need for a limiting factor or factors on the negative
aspects of self-interest.
Smith's system posited a limitation on the size and scope of
institutions, an enhancement of individualism, and the moderating
influence of the divine hand of God to smooth out the system and
increase societal wealth.69 Marx, and to a large degree institutional
economist Veblen, took a fatalist or blind evolutionary view of the
social order. 70 The Commons' process, however, posits a purposeful,
artificially selected and human-directed evolution. Through the ma-
nipulation of limiting factors and the growth of institutions "in
control, liberation, and expansion of individual action," a balance
is achieved. 71 Thus, Commons distinguishes himself from the notions
of Adam Smith's invisible hand of divine providence and Veblen's
blind forces of nature to imply a system capable of being pur-
posefully manipulated through collective action.
The Commons' paradigm takes issue with economic theory which
attempts to remove the human hand from the analysis. 72 First, the
Commons' paradigm rejects the concept that economic behavior is
did not escape Smith, although it seems to have been overlooked by many of those who use his work
to justify broad deregulation.
The capricious ambition of kings and ministers has not, during the present and preceding
century, been more fatal to the repose of Europe, than the impertinent jealousy of merchants
and manufacturers. The violence and injustice of rulers of mankind is an ancient evil, for
which, I am afraid, the nature of human affairs can scarce admit of a remedy. But the
mean rapacity, the monopolizing spirit of merchants and manufacturers, who neither are,
nor ought to be, the rulers of mankind, though it cannot perhaps be corrected, may very
easily be prevented from disturbing the tranquility of any body but themselves.
Id. at 460.
The government of an exclusive company of merchants is, perhaps, the worst of all gov-
ernments for any country whatever.
Id. at 537.
68. To quote Adam Smith again:
Our merchants and master-manufacturers complain much of the bad effects of high wages
in raising the price, and thereby lessening the sale of their goods both at home and abroad.
They say nothing concerning the bad effects of high profits. They are silent with regard
to the pernicious effects of their own gains. They complain only of those of other people.
Id. at 98.
69. J. COMMONS, INsTrrtUIoNAL EcoNOacs, supra note 20, at 140-57 & 158-217.
70. J. Co isONs, LEGAL FOtUNDAAONS, supra note 13, at 376.
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always rationally motivated. 73 When behavior is expanded across the
bargaining, managerial, and rationing transactions embracing ele-
ments of economic, physical, and moral power, rational deliberative
motivation can be skewed by institutional, short term, solely private
interests. 74 Second, the illusion of perfect information in many ec-
onomic models disappears if one accepts that information exchange
is, itself, a transaction with its attendant power calculus and human
manipulation. 75 And third, the pragmatist, recognizing the human
hand, also recognizes human manipulation and skeptically looks to
the purpose being served by its proponent. This formulation denies
reliance on an all powerful sovereign or deferral to a deity and
thereby encourages critical debate. 76
There is inevitable conflict between the individual and the col-
lective which can be viewed in two subsets: first, the relationship
73. One can develop models of rational response to stimuli if the human will is removed.
Recognizing the human will implies a sometimes not so rational response to particular stimuli or
utilitarian behavior due to limited or erroneous information, emotion, or cultural or religious mo-
tivations. Recognition of reality should temper the use of many economic models.
74.
Individuals . . . learn the custom of language, of cooperation with other individuals, of
working towards common ends, of negotiations to eliminate conflicts of interest, of sub-
ordination to the working rules of the many concerns of which they are members. They
meet each other, not as physiological bodies moved by glands, nor as 'globules of desire'
moved by pain and pleasure, similar to the forces of physical and animal nature, but as
prepared more or less by habit, induced by the pressure of custom, to engage in those
highly artificial transactions created by the collective human will.
J. CoMMONS, INsTITUTONAL EcoNoMcS, supra note 20, at 73-74.
Production . . . involves, not only the making of goods to gratify existing wants, but also
the creation and guidance of demand, the whole process of bargaining and negotiation by
which the terms of division are settled, and the underlying function of defining and enforcing
rights of person and property, which determines to just what extent business can be parasitic
and still remain legal. And in a more fundamental way still, the individual is so molded
in body, mind, and character by his economic activities and relations, stimuli and disabilities,
freedoms and servitudes, that industry can truly be said to make the men and women who
work in it, no less than the commodities it turns out for the market.
J. CLARK, SOCIAL CONTROL OF BusINmSS 46 (1926).
75. Manipulation of information is simply a form of pursuing institutional purposes and self
interest.
76. See infra note 92 and accompanying text. The tension points in the Commons' paradigm
are readily apparent. Moreover, they are neither ignored nor simply assumed away. A tension point
can be viewed as the convergence of two or more justifiable positions. At this convergence point
conflict arises and hard choices resulting in an accommodation or balance become necessary. Unlike
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of standardized expectations and order vis-a-vis anarchy and self
interest;" and second, the creation and valuation of property rights
vis-a-vis the limits of individual liberty.78 These tension points are
nothing new to legal scholars. There is, however, a subtle but highly
significant conceptual assumption involved in the Commons' balance
formulation. Commons recognizes the limits on definitions in lan-
guage - the tools of the lawyer's trade.79 He recognizes the ability
of institutions to obfuscate, and problem or purpose definition
emerges as an independent issue requiring clarification. With a hu-
man creation and human manipulation, the pragmatist Commons
attempts to transcend ideological andtheological rhetoric. Thus, there
are no sacred private interests or positions in the paradigm.8 0 Each
is but a limiting or complementary factor at a sequential point in
time evaluated in terms of "good proportioning" vis-a-vis "bad pro-
portioning" of the commonwealth.81
Moreover, the public purpose is never a neutral bystander. It
either grants, directly or indirectly, to private interests a portion of
the collective power or, through the same collective power, sanctions
the activity.82 Given the interdependency between institutional trans-
actions, no action by a sovereign in a particular area (e.g., dereg-
77. J. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 13, at 318, 324, & 327.
78. Id. at 316, 318, & 341; Commons, Law and Economics, supra note 37, at 374-76. The
development of property is based in custom and occupies a significant portion of Commons' historical
analysis of custom.
79. Law is language and language describes the purposes and the procedures. "Words are
symbols or signs by which men convey to each other not only interesting ideas but also inducements
to act." J. COMaONS, LEGAL FoUtNDATONS, supra note 13, at 331. As an idea, law is plagued by the
double and triple meanings of terms dependent not only on their context but on the cultural and
historical environment. Commons' writing approach and style focuses upon the evolution of language'
(legal and economic terms in particular) attempting to identify the concepts involved rather than mere
definitions. The problems with language are illustrated in Pierce, Illustrations of the Logic of Science:
How to Make Our Ideas Clear, 12 PopuiAR Sci. MONTHLY 286 (1878). Commons held this piece in
high esteem. To understand Commons' writings, one must understand his approach to the use of
language. The symbols used do not have static meanings but, as Lewis Carroll's Alice discovered,
can be made to mean whatever a powerful institution wants them to mean.
80. This logically follows if viewed as human selected classifications of transactions in the public
interest. Nor is this view anti-religious; it simply denies the blame or justification to a deity, forcing
one to accept human accountability and with it the burden of human solution.
81. Rather than an invisible hand of a deity, the flexibility of the system allows for experi-
mentation - the making of wrong choices. The concept of a synergistic system with inputs from varied
sources may tend to mitigate the negative effects and self correct the system in balance.
82. See supra notes 33 & 52 and accompanying text.
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ulation) is an affirmative action and can result in problem
redefinition, exploiting that area, by an institution. Problem rede-
finition can be directed toward an area where use of collective power
is recognized, thereby restricting the scope of the opposition's re-
sponse (i.e., using national guard as security in labor dispute under
the aegis of protecting property), or toward unrestricted use of pri-
vate power (i.e., casting plant relocation decisions in non-labor cost
terms to avoid the duty to bargain collectively under the National
Labor Relations Act). 83 Nevertheless, a response is stimulated and
the public interest is affected.
C. The Invisible Hand of Custom
The question of why a conflict is resolved one way rather than
another predominates in Commons' treatment of custom. Commons
sought a theory of "reasonableness" in the valuation of positions.
This valuation is a social rather than an individual valuation a val-
uation of classes of interests in the institutional or collective or-
ganizational structure. Reasonableness is essentially the determination
of how much disparity of physical, moral, and economic power is
tolerable. It is the process of seeking balance in the tension points.
Order and the standardization of expectations arise through the cre-
ation of working rules which delineate a power balance through the
protection of rights and the correlative creation of duties.
To Commons, the lack of a pragmatic balance between law and
custom was reflected in the writings of the early legal scholars. In-
stead of seeking balance and accommodation, the positions became
somewhat polarized with Hobbes and Bentham arguing law as com-
mand oT the sovereign vis-a-vis Coke and Blackstone viewing law
as found in custom and backed by sovereign power. 84
83. This can occur by the definition of the issue to meet a legal forum's jurisdiction and is
facilitated by information control and manipulation. See supra note 61 discussion and citations.
84. Commons, Law and Economics, supra note 37, at 371-72; J. COMMONS, Lnoaii FOUNDA-
nONS, supra note 13, at 298-300. See also J. COMMONS, INsTrrTiONAL EcoNomics, supra note 20, at
218-43.
Jeremy Bentham viewed law as made by the command of a superior authority in the furtherance
of the maximum happiness for all (greatest good for the greatest number). Purpose was selected based
on an individualist calculus of pain and pleasure' supported by reason. J. COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL
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As most modern scholars would agree, the two are but insep-
arable components of the whole of law. The working rulesof society
begin as customs. The approved customs become the common law
established by the dispute resolution forums. Legal history has well
documented the rigidity of the common law courts necessitating the
creation of equity forums to further the ideal of justice. The need
for standardization of expectations through the balancing of power
results in the common law pronouncements being codified into sta-
tutes. The need for limitations on the sovereign's power, a constraint
on command-and-obedience relationships, evolved, frequently
through revolution, into constitutional law.85 An over emphasis on
codification results in rigidity and perhaps social upheaval. 86 The
over emphasis on common law, although gradually removing in-
justice on an experimental basis, lacks uniformity and consistency,
particularly in the human interpretation of what constitutes God's
will. Moreover, codes do not supplant completely the common law
but simply complement, with standardization, certain aspects of a
complex transaction or classification of transactions. 87
Law is a subset, albeit the most significant one, of the broader
category of working rules in society. Writes Commons:
Law was looked upon, not as the working rules of a going concern adopted by
the participants in a world of limited resources according to the principle of
scarcity, but as a mechanical unfolding of ideal concepts of liberty, justice and
law. The individual was the unit, liberty the goal and law the mechanism. Yet
ECONOMCS, supra note 20, at 220-27; Commons, Law and Economics, supra note 37, at 371-73.
Bentham rejected an intransigent view of common law to focus primarily on the creation of code
law. He disposed of Blackstone's common law as mere ancient wisdom supported by authority. J.
COLMONS, INsTrruroNwA. EcoNoMncs, supra note 20, at 239-40; Commons, Law and Economics, supra
note 37, at 371-73. Law is imposed from above relying on a standardization of expectations through
the sovereign's creation of a happiness maximizer. To Bentham, custom and common law had no
impact on the sovereign carrying out its obligation to maximize the happiness of the inferiors.
In contrast, Blackstone viewed law as founded by judges from the customs of the people. His
focus is upon the unwritten law formulated piecemeal by the courts. To Blackstone, the common law
and foundational customs are simply there as made by God or beneficient nature waiting to be
discovered by the courts. As such, it could not nor need not be changed or codified.
85. J. COMMONS, LEGAL FouNDATIONS, supra note 13, at 300-01. See also supra note 2.
86. J. COMMONS, INSTTUroNAL ECONOsCS, supra note 20, at 223.
87. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). The majority opinion,
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every concern must have its working rules, which are its laws. These spring from
authority, custom, habit, initiative, or what not. They are the common law, the
statute law, the equity jurisprudence of the concern. The state, the business con-
cern and the cultural concern are alike in their dependence on these working rules,
the difference being mainly in the kind of sanctions, whether physical, economic,
or moral, which they can bring to bear in enforcing the rules. And the declarations
and enforcement of the rules create a complete outfit of rights, duties, liberties
and exposures of each member occupying each position in the particular concern.,,
Commons looks to customs as the building blocks to achieve his
reasonable balance. Custom, writes Commons, is the "common-sense
activities of people in planning for the future on the experience of
the past."' 89 But custom is more than mere "instinctive, impulsive,
unthinking habit of uniformity in action." 90 Custom is purposeful;
it is "transactions of similar classes of individuals under similar
circumstances. "91
Customs are, indeed, the raw material out of which justice is constructed. But
customs differ, customs change, customs are good and bad, and customs conflict.
They are uncertain, complex, contradictory, and confusing. A choice must be
made. Somebody must choose which customs to authorize and which to condemn
or let alone. Carter maintains his thesis [common law is made by God or Be-
neficient nature] only by distinguishing 'custom' from 'bad practice.' 'Custom'
is good custom; 'bad practice' is bad custom. Who shall say? Is it the voice of
God? Is it the law of Nature? Is it universal reason, or the vox populi? Carter
criticised the Supreme Court because, in a railroad consolidation case it did not
authorize the modern custom of business in consolidating corporations and elim-
inating competition. Apparently that custom is the voice of God. Others approve
the Supreme Court when it condemns the modern custom of labor organizations
in boycotting employers whom they deem unfair. Apparently that custom is not
the voice of God.-
Custom is dynamic, naked behavi6r, stripped of divine beneficence,
laws of nature or benevolent dictators.
Power and institutional purposes are never far removed from the
analysis. With power, the individuals acting through institutions ex-
ercise discretion in establishing the purpose and process of the work-
88. J. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 13, at 332-33 (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 301.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 300 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 299-300. 26
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ing rules which become custom and then possibly law. 93 Law, and
particularly due process, is a variant of the process of choosing
between purposes. Due process differs from the broader process of
thinking and acting in that "it is guided by sympathy and limited
by duty.' 94 Nevertheless, while due process seeks consistency and
fundamental fairness, it too is a process of choosing between those
rights "that are deemed important by the court. '95
Custom is not only a guide to establish the working rules which
may become law but also is a check on those rules. 96 The dynamics
of the system creates a nest of interlocking institutions and working
rules each with their own working rules and purposes. 97 Custom
represents prior expressions of public purposes. But resolving the
tensions in a dynamic system requires more depth than relying on
the past or merely choosing the customs of one powerful institution
over those of another. 98 The anomalies inherent in the system can
only be smoothed out by a greater understanding and robust critique
of the system itself.
V. FUTURE DIRECTIONS: A HOPELESS MIRE oF COMPLEXITY?
Commons recognized the complexity of the interactions ema-
nating from physical, economic and moral power in creating working
rules balancing the conflicting concerns of a modern social order.
The available tools of analysis largely reflect the vague and con-
troversial nature of the concepts addressed. The legal methodology
embracing case analysis and argumentation from precedent arguably
produces an acceptable level of order and flexibility. But simply
because a rule is consistent does not necessarily imply that it serves
the intended purpose. The level of complexity required in law should
93. Discretion is the choosing among opportunities, and behavior is the process component of
choosing. Behavior, wrote Commons, is the complex "process of moving the muscles in conformity
with the habits, ideals, definitions, classifications, investigations, valuations, and choices leading on
to further behavior in the reach for purposes yet unattained." J. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS,
supra note 13, at 351.
94. Id. at 351.
95. Id. at 341.
96. See supra note 92.
97. See supra note 88.
98. J. COmMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 13, at 283-312.
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encompass both consistent standardization of expectations (proce-
dural reliability) and achievement of its designated purpose (sub-
stantive validity). Given the complexity of interactions in the social
order and the limitations inherent in language and data collection,
valuation and judgment are more difficult to defend substantively
than procedurally.
Due process and due purpose are, of course, intertwined. Each
is both influenced by and, in turn, influences the other. Akin to
the concept that action or no action are both affirmative responses,
the law-giver is not passive. Thus, the myth of judicial activism can
be logically refuted. Each is simply activist in one direction rather
than another - but nevertheless is still making choices. 99 Wishing
the social order followed a simple linear economic model or that
mental images are entirely capable of being represented by language
may be politically expedient but has little relevance to solving real
world problems.
Thus, the complexity cannot be denied; what is needed to un-
derstand the complexity is not to scrap our present methodology
but to find additional tools, ones that do not treat a complex social
order as if it were exclusively an economic or other bounded dis-
ciplinary problem. The engineering sciences again offer some meth-
odological assistance in understanding complex nonlinear interactions.
To one familiar with the terminology and techniques insystem
dynamics, the Commons' paradigm, although developed sixty odd
years ago, is describing the mental images and foundational as-
sumptions which are preliminary considerations to constructing
models in system dynamics. Commons' views of limiting and com-
plementary factors, the structure and contours of transactions, power
and custom, and the underlying assumptions and tension points in-
teract to form a complex system of social order. Commons at-
tempted to work out these complex interactions with observation
99. The recent speeches by Attorney General Meese echoing simplistic notions of language and
history have prompted retorts from two sitting Supreme Court Justices. See, e.g., The Right's Quest
for Law from a Mythical Past, Wash. Post, Nov. 3, 1985, at Cl. See also addresses by Attorney
General Meese before the ABA in Washington D.C. (July 9, 1985) and in London (July 17, 1985).
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and his mind. The mind, however, is limited in its ability to process
large amounts of data and trace interactions in a timely manner.
But the mind images augmented by recent advances in computer
modeling can begin to embrace more complexity. The complexity
represented by the Commons' paradigm is a significant building block
for a system dynamics model in the public policy area. 10°
The key to system dynamics is the creation of descriptive
models. 101 System dynamics is but a tool of analysis; it is only as
valid as the model-makers mental imagery of the system. Thus, the
most important aspect is not the massaging of computer results but
the integration of descriptive knowledge drawn from all pertinent
sources. The computer specialist alone is not capable of creating a
model. Only those students of the varied components of the social
100. Professor Jay Forrester writes, system dynamics "is a profession that integrates knowledge
(mostly descriptive) about the real world, with the concepts of how feedback structures cause all
change through time, and with the art of computer simulation for dealing with systems that are too
complex for mathematical analysis." Forrester, System Dynamics, supra note 8, at 7. System dynamics
embraces the nonlinearity of interactions and, through its incorporation of feedback structures, "moves
on to finding changes in structure and policy that will make the system better behaved." Id. See also
supra note 8.
An essential feature of system dynamics is the concept of feedback and the types of dynamic
system behavior it can generate. The theory is quite simple. Factors operating within the system are
affected by and in turn affect the change agent in the system. These causal interactions can be traced
out and examined. Feedback factors cannot simply be assumed away since they can significantly alter
the intended purpose of a change agent, possibly resulting in unexpected distortions or self correction
toward preexisting system stability.
Commons' view of the self correction of capitalism through the trial and error flexibility generated
by common law and custom provide a statement as to the effect of feedback structures. Evolving
custom tended to mediate the adverse effects of change agents and move toward standardization and
order. The feedback concept also appears in his treatment of limiting and complementary factors.
The manipulation of a limiting factor interacts with the complementary factors, through time, changing
the public wealth. Feedback renders the factor limiting only at a successive point in time.
In system dynamics the beginning point is a real world problem or the achievement of a designated
purpose. With the problem or purpose in mind, the interactive components of the system are described.
Through the use of flow charts, causal links and feedback loops are identified. System assumptions,
projections and "mental models" are incorporated to create a best guess representation. The resulting
model can be studied or manipulated under various projected scenarios. Using this system model the
decision maker can enter a more reasoned judgment.
101. The creation of specific legal policy models is beyond the scope of this introductory article.
System dynamics is not the exclusive province of engineers and mathematicians. The mental models
of the legal system can only come from those working and studying in that system. For a general
overview of system dynamics techniques and methodology see Forrester, System Dynamics, supra note
8; J. RANDERS, ELEm Nir OF Tm SYsTEM DYNAs Ncs MEMoD (1980); E. ROBERTS, MANAcERIA3 Ap-
PLICATIONS OF SYSTEM DYNAmics (1978).
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order can create useful models. In the public policy area, those var-
ied disciplines may be able to achieve a synergy in analysis parallel
to the synergy of interaction in real world problems.
Returning to the questions posed in the Overview, how can we
assess whether a piece of legislation is "bad" proportioning or
"good" proportioning or whether allowing a common law action
does/does not serve the public purpose? Legal argumentation spec-
ulates on the negative/positive effects of a legal rule, on what is
truth, public purpose, and justice. System dynamics does not change
the arguments but does have the potential for providing the par-
ticularized models of public purpose interactions to legislators and
judges; with additional information can come better reasoned de-
cisions. System dynamics is at the threshold stage. The writings of
John R. Commons are useful as philosophical writings on political
economy, but more importantly, are a beginning point in system
analysis and model building. Commons' theory has the potential to
be a useful tool in the legal policymaker's toolbox.
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